Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g., the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g., true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a ‘rejection’ of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown that reliabilism—the most prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of Berker's main targets—survives Berker's arguments unscathed.
This is a pre-copyrighted, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Quarterly following peer review. The version of record Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn, "A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism," The Philosophical Quarterly (2014) doi:10.1093/pq/pq034 first published June 14, 2014 is available online at: http://pq.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/06/10/pq.pqu034.full?ijkey=n4SWxfDqhaxwiYY&keytype=ref